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Multinationals at Risk: Terrorism and the Rule of
Law
Frederick V. Perry
If you wish to converse with me, define your terms.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Companies and commerce are at risk. Even if they are not themselves the specific targets of attacks, experience seems to show that
they can be victims of collateral damage. Faced with the dangers and
prospects of coping with terrorist attacks, in the view of the author,
companies are at risk for at least two major reasons. The first is that
the world community confronts a dilemma – trying to combat some2
thing that it cannot clearly identify or define: terrorism. The international community has so far dealt with the problem by means of a variety of piecemeal, crime-specific treaties; nothing comprehensive and
nothing that defines terrorism.3 The second problem is the apparent
lack on the part of many companies to take the threat seriously and
harden themselves as targets, or at least make themselves less attractive targets.4
States are challenged with the problem of identifying those acts
of “terror” that are designed to bring about political change: activity
which disrupts international relations through violence that the world
views as undesirable international norms of behavior.5 Globalization
Clinical Professor of Business Law, Florida International University. The Author
acknowledges with gratitude the able assistance in research and editorial comment of Alexandra
Kagan, a Ph.D. student at Florida International University.
1
David A. Green, “I’m OK - You’re OK” Educating Lawyers to “Maintain a Normal
Client-Lawyer Relationship” With a Client With a Mental Disability, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 65, 65
(2003) (quoting phrase commonly attributed to Voltaire).
2
Kofi Anan, Secretary General of the United Nations, A Global Strategy for Fighting
Terrorism, Keynote Address at the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy,
Terrorism and Security (March 8-11, 2005), (transcript available at http://english.safedemocracy.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-fighting-terrorism.html#audio).
3
4

Id.
Id.

5
John Dugard, Towards the Definition of International Terrorism, 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 94,
94 (1973).
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increases firms’ vulnerability, as multinational corporations are on the
6
front lines around the world; they are exposed, mostly as soft targets
of opportunity for terrorist attacks, since, in the minds of many wouldbe terrorists, they become a symbol or proxy for their home countries.7 Thus, attacking a multinational, its employees, or its facilities, is
8
often considered an attack on the home country, since it is simpler
than traveling to the United States, for example, in order to attack a
symbol of its lifestyle (McDonald’s)9 or its rampant capitalism (the
10
pharmaceutical industry).
The purpose of this paper is two-fold: first, to examine the scope
of the problem of terrorism as it affects business in general, and second, the dilemma posed by a lack of definition of the term “terrorism.” This paper suggests that a case can be made that the world really does need a universal definition of terrorism, and that companies
should take threats seriously, or at least more than they appear to
have done. Finally, this paper suggests a way to arrive at universal
consensus on a legal definition of the term “terrorism.”
II. BUSINESS AS TARGET
Of course, Osama Bin Laden is now dead. Some say that al11
Qaeda will die with him, or that the fear of the threat of terrorist
12
13
attacks is overblown. Others are not so sure. Documents retrieved
in the raid on Osama Bin Laden’s compound indicate that al-Qaeda
may have been planning raids on oil tankers worldwide in order to
disrupt the world’s energy supplies.14

6
See generally Barbara Krug & Patrick Reinmoeller, The Hidden Costs of Ubiquity:
Globalisation and Terrorism, 2003 ROTTERDAM INST. OF MGMT, http://repub.eur.nl/

res/pub/993/ERS%20062.pdf.
7
8
9
10

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

11 Fareed Zakaria, Al Qaeda is Over, THE GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE, CNN WORLD (May
2, 2011), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/05/02/al-qaeda-is-dead/; see also Miriam
F. Elman, After Osama Bin Laden: The Future of Al Qaeda and the Study of Terrorism,
CONFLICT
&
COLLABORATION
(May
3,
2011),
http://conflictandcollaboration.wordpress.com/2011/05/
03/after-osama-bin-laden-the-future-of-al-qaeda-and-the-study-of-terrorism/.
12 John Mueller, Is There Still a Terrorist Threat? , 85 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2, 2, 4-5 (2006).
13 The Future of Al Qaeda after Bin Laden, PUB. RADIO INT’L (May 3, 2011),
http://www.pri.org/stories/world/middle-east/the-future-of-al-qaeda-after-bin-laden.html.
14 Teresa Anderson, Morning Security Brief: Lawmakers Discuss Border Issues, DHS
Warns Oil Industry, and the Patriot Act Extended, SEC. MGMT. (May 23, 2011), http://www.
securitymanagement.com/news/morning-security-brief-lawmakers-discuss-border-issues-dhs-warns
-oil-industry-and-patriot-act-e.
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Whether or not al-Qaeda survives, many believe that the problem of international terrorism and its causes goes much deeper than
15
one man and his organization. This could mean that terrorism will
be with us for a while because the current phenomenon of unpredictable international terrorist attacks by non-state actors seems to be a
reaction to globalization and is facilitated by it.16 It appears, at least,
that Osama Bin Laden’s franchisees, imitators, those who have been
inspired by him, and those who are motivated by other grievances will
continue to pose a threat to the international community.17 New
threats continue to be debated,18 and as Professor Dean C. Alexander
has stated, “The daily barrage of predictions of terrorist attacks
against numerous business targets – chemical plants, shopping malls,
aviation, mass transit, and financial institutions – has accelerated the
need to highlight additional lessons learned thus far on the impact of
terrorism on business.”19
Terrorism seems to be the economical weapon of choice of the
weak actor against the strong nation-state. For the organization that
wishes to seek revenge, extract something, convince a population or
government to take some path or abstain from some policy, it is certainly far cheaper to terrorize than to engage in conventional military
operations. Armies do not have to be supported in the field, large
amounts of heavy weapons do not have to be purchased, and no uniforms need to be bought. A well-placed bomb here or there, a strategic kidnapping, and an assassination all can work to affect many
minds on the cheap. “As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers
coercive power with many of the advantages of military force at a
fraction of the cost. Due to the secretive nature and small size of terrorist organizations, they often offer opponents no clear organization

15 See generally JAMAL R. NASSAR, GLOBALIZATION & TERRORISM: THE MIGRATION
DREAMS AND NIGHTMARES 23-42 (Manfred B. Steger et al. eds, 2d ed. 2010).
16 Audrey Kurth Cronin, Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism, 27
INT’L SEC. 30, 30-58 (2002-2003).
17 Richard N. Haass, Terrorism Concerns after Bin Laden, THE BLOG, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 2, 2011, 9:44 AM), http://huffingtonpost.com/richard-n-haass/terrorism-concerns-after_b_856253.html.
18 The World’s Policeman, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/
opinion/nypd-blind-threat-york-terrorism-iran-article-1.1016282; see also Protecting America:
Are We Doing Enough?, Interview with Philip Zelikow by & , 11 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 149, 151,
154-156 (March 5, 2010); Terrorism: What is the State of Global Terrorism Today, Nearly a

OF

Decade After the Sept. 11 Attacks? Foreign Policy Asked the Top Terrorism Experts in the
Field. Here's What They Told Us, 89 FOREIGN POL’Y 96 (2011); , Solutions for a World in Crisis, 41 THE FUTURIST 3, 3 (2007).
19

(2004).

DEAN C. ALEXANDER, BUSINESS CONFRONTS TERRORISM: RISKS AND RESPONSES 17
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to defend against or to deter.”20 As one writer has said: “Terrorism is
designed to have a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. . . .
[S]ince terrorism is designed for an audience and not just victims; the
media has played a crucial role. . . .”21 In fact, terrorism is witnessed
by most people through the media.
According to Professors Larobina and Pate of Sacred Heart University: “Terrorism has impacted multiple levels of society across the
world community. One of those levels is the business environment.”22
One of the aims of terrorism seems to be to disrupt and destroy ongo23
ing business, providing both a show of victims and an interruption of
24
commerce. If that is the case, then the ability of governments to disrupt and destroy terrorism may be essential to the continued growth
and expansion of the world economy.
The United States is a frequent target of such attacks, and United
States’ business interests are at the front line, so to speak, all over the
globe.25 According to one writer, more than two-thirds of the United
States’ targets of international terrorism attacks in 1999 were United
26
States’ businesses. As a practical matter, of course, companies the
world over – and not just those based in the United States – are potential targets.
The World Trade Center was first bombed on February 26,
1993.27 Because of the nature of 9/11, any security preparation that
the World Trade Center might have undertaken between the two attacks availed very little. The World Travel and Tourism Council said
that terrorist attacks “have dampened short-term demand for Travel
& Tourism and created a more uncertain world.”28 In 2003, the Council issued a “Travel and Tourism Security Action Plan” with the aim

20 What is Terrorism?, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SECURITY RESEARCH,
http://www.terrorism-research.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2012).
21 Luke Howie, A Role for Business in the War on Terror, 18 DISASTER PREVENTION
MGMT. 100, 101 (2009).
22 Michael D. Larobina & Richard L. Pate, The Impact of Terrorism on Business, 3 J.
GLOBAL BUS. ISSUES 147, 147 (2009).
23

Id.

24

Krug & Reinmoelle 999). ,,al Crimesural Stud., International Terrorism, N CounterTerrorism Treaties, supra note 6.
25 Paul R. Pillar, Is the Terrorist Threat Misunderstood? , 45 SEC. MGMT. 136, 136 (2001).
26

Id.
See World Trade Center Bombed, HISTORY.COM (Feb. 26, 1993),
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/world-trade-center-bombed.
28 Travel & Tourism Security Action Plan, WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM COUNCIL 1
(2003),
available
at
27

http://fama2.us.es:8080/turismo/turismonet1/economia%20del%20turismo/mercados
%20turisticos/travel%20and%20tourism%20security%20plan.pdf.
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“to limit potential damage wrought by terrorism and ultimately to
defeat it.”29
Business facilities worldwide, and executives and employees –
30
Companies must
both travelling and stationary – are vulnerable.
work to reduce the threat of murders, bombings, and kidnappings for
31
ransom (some terrorist organizations finance themselves in this way).
For corporations with a worldwide footprint, problems can occur at
any moment as they have in New York in 2001, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, Mumbai in 2010,32 and Moscow in 2010.33 In 2005, the
Grand Hyatt, Radisson, and Days Inn were attacked by terrorist
bombers in Amman, Jordan, killing 60 people and injuring 115.34 In
January 2012, Kenyan authorities warned their population of an im35
pending terror threat. According to one study, the United Kingdom
is at greater risk of terrorist attacks than any other country.36 In February 2012, four British subjects pled guilty to a plot to bomb the
London Stock Exchange.37 In January of the same year, two men
38
were sentenced to prison by a court in Oslo, Norway, for plotting to
attack a Danish newspaper which had printed cartoons of the Prophet
Muhammad in 2005.39
Global trade is growing – albeit slowed down by the recession of
2008 and 2009 – and with it non-governmental organizations
(“NGO”), for-profit corporations, and the incidents of individual

29

Id.

30

Charlene Marmer Solomon, Global Business Under Siege, WORKFORCE (Jan. 1, 1997),
http://www.workforce.com/article/19970101/NEWS02/301019961.
31

Id.

32

Robert Johnston, Deadliest Terrorist Strikes, Worldwide, JOHNSTON’S ARCHIVE,
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255i.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2012).
33 Luke Harding & Mark Tran, Moscow Bombs Kills Dozens, THE GUARDIAN (March 29,
2010), guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/29/moscow-metro-bombs-explosions-terror.
34 Dean C. Alexander, Anti-terror Calculations: What’s Next? , SECURITY (March 16,
2006), http://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/anti-terror-calculations-whats-next-1.
35 Britain Warns of Increased Risk of Terror Attack in Kenya , TIMES OF INDIA (Jan. 8,
2012), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/Britain-warns-of-increased-risk-ofterror-attack-in-Kenya/articleshow/11409453.cms.
36 UK at Greater Terror Attack Risk Than Any Other Western Nation: Study , THE ECON.
TIMES (Aug. 4, 2011), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-08-04/news/29850521_
1_terrorism-risk-index-uk-maplecroft.
37 Jennifer Rowland, Four Plead Guilty to London Stock Exchange Plot, FOREIGN
POLICY
(Feb.
3,
2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/03/the_lwot_four_plead_guilty_to_
london_stock_exchange_plot. (The Legal War on Terror Brief is a special project of the New
America Foundation and Foreign Policy and is published as a series by Foreign Policy).
38
39

Id.
Id.
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40
travel abroad, thereby increasing vulnerability. In short, business is
at risk. Aside from all other asset-based risks, under the common law,
at least, companies owe a duty of care to their employees, meaning
the company should take reasonable precautions to protect its employees against foreseeable risk. If they do not, they could be found
41
liable in tort. How do they do that in light of the risks that are being
42
run?
Further, managers must involve themselves in counterterrorism and in security issues inasmuch as they have the obligation
43
of protecting customers, clients, and the public, leading one set of
writers to say that “protecting a firm’s resource base against terrorism
is as crucial a management task as increasing its asset’s value.”44 A
study by the Economist Intelligence unit provides that:

Where businesses are the target of terrorism, it is usuallybecause
of what they represent, rather than anything they do or don’t do
themselves. Global brands can assume symbolic significance for
terrorists. The US National Counterterrorism Center’s list of
significant terrorist events describes 24 attacks on McDonald’s
restaurants between 1993 and 2005 worldwide. Of the minority
where responsibility was claimed, motivation for the attacks included nationalism, anti-globalisation, religion and Marxism –
but in each case the perpetrators objected to the restaurant as a
symbol of America, not a purveyor of products.45
How does a corporation prepare for the unknown? According to
some security specialists, some companies should not only attempt to
reduce risk – since they cannot eliminate it – but they should also have
contingency plans for when a disaster strikes.46
Risk Management Solutions, a provider of products and services
to manage and quantify catastrophic risk, believes that since governments have taken many strides to lower the risk of terrorist attacks
against government and military targets, terrorists are more likely to
target the commercial or private sector, especially sporting events. 47
40 Rachel Briggs, Keeping Your People Safe: The Legal and Policy Framework for Duty of
Care 7 (The Foreign Policy Centre, Working Paper No. 1, 2003), available at http://fpc.

org.uk/fsblob/126.pdf.
41
42
43

Id.
Id.

Howie, supra note 21.
Barbara Krug & Patrick Reinmoeller, The Hidden Costs of Ubiquity: Globalisation and
Terrorism, ROTTERDAM INST. OF MGMT. 41 (2003).
45 Lord Levene, Under Attack? Global Business and the Threat of Political Violence,
ECON. INT’L UNIT LTD. & LLOYD’S 2, 14 (2007).
46 Diane
Ritchey, Going Global, SECURITY MAGAZINE (Jan. 1, 2011),
http://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/81594-going-global
47 See RISK MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS, http://www.rms.com/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
44
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They simply are softer targets. The facts seem to bear this out, and
the terrorists of today tend to kill and injure indiscriminately as many
as they can, mostly or almost exclusively civilians; they generally
choose tourist facilities, hotels, mass transit, and business facilities as
48
49
targets. As can be seen from the following chart (Figure 1), the
great majority of attacks in 2010 did not target government or military
targets, but rather, the targets were civilians, and included companies
and infrastructures.
50

Figure 1:

Terrorist attacks normally have an effect on stock markets in
causing significant negative abnormal returns; that is, stocks lose val51
ue. Terrorism can actually have multiple effects on the securities
52
Moody’s has downgraded a number of securities because
market.
53
they believed the securities to have inadequate terrorism insurance.

48 Michael R. Czinkota et al., Terrorism and International Business: A Research Agenda ,
41 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 826, 829 (2010).
49 2010 Report on Terrorism, THE NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER (Apr. 30, 2011),
http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/docs/2010_report_on_terrorism.pdf.
50

Id.

51

Doug McIntyre, Terrorism’s Effects on Wall Street, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 9, 2011),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/terrorism.asp.
52 Dean Starkman, Moody's Downgrades Securities on Lack of Terrorism Insurance,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2002, at C.14.
53

Id.
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Further, one analysis of shareholder returns following the 9/11 attacks
indicates that the market value of publicly-traded companies with a
high percentage of foreign sales fell disproportionately immediately
following the attacks, and those same companies continued trading at
54
a discount one year later.
Terrorist violence is a global risk, and it affects the worldwide
economy and financial markets in general. We know that the immediate effect of such attacks is an immediate aversion for risk on the
part of investors. Investors in stock markets, as mentioned above, and
consumers in the intermediate and longer term also lose confidence
and become risk averse, so that consumption and investment are both
lowered. This effect spills over not only to stock markets, but also to
fixed-income market yields, currency, and commodity markets. The
result is an adverse effect on economic activity, in general, often triggering an economic slowdown, maybe even a recession.55
Stock markets around the world negatively reacted to the terrorist attacks in New York on 9/11, as evidenced in the following chart
(Table 1).
Table 1 – Stock Reactions to Terrorist Attacks on 9/11/2001:56
Closing Closing
price on price on
09/10/01 09/17/01

Country

Symbol

Exchange
Name

United
States

DJI

Dow Jones
9,605.51
Industrial
Average

8,920.70

Recovered
to closing
price from
09/10/2001
on… at…
11/09/2001
9,608.00

54 Michael Hergeil, The Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Shareholder Value: A Study of
United States International Firms, 21 INT’L J. MGMT. 25, 25 (2004).
55 G. Andrew Karolyi, The Consequences of Terrorism for Financial Markets: What Do
We Know? 1 (Fisher College of Bus. at Ohio State Univ., Working Paper, May 7, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=904398.
56 DJI – Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EDJI+
Historical+Prices (last visited Aug. 1, 2012); IXIC – Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EIXIC+Historical+Prices (last visited Aug. 1, 2012); DAX
–
Historical
Prices,
YAHOO!
FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EGDAXI+Historical
+Prices (last visited Aug. 1, 2012); FTSE – Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://
finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EFTSE+Historical+Prices (last visited Aug. 1, 2012); IBEX –
Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EIBEX+Historical
+Prices (last visited Aug. 1, 2012); N100 – Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EN100+Historical+Prices (last visited Aug. 1, 2012).
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United
States

IXIC

NASDAQ

1,695.38

1,579.55

10/11/2001
1,701.47

Germany

DAX

Frankfurt
Stock
Exchange

4,670.13

4,243.68

10/11/2001
4,718.46

United
Kingdom

FTSE

London
Stock
Exchange

5,033.70

4,898.90

10/05/2001
5,036.00

Spain

IBEX

BME
Spanish
Exchanges

7,678.70

7,094.80

10/17/2001
7,918.60

Belgium,
France,
Holland,
Portugal

N100

Euronext

759.13

710.99

10/23/2001
761.86

The train bombings in Madrid on March 11, 2004 had a negative
effect on European markets, as can be seen from the following chart
(Table 2).
Table 2 – Stock Reactions to Madrid Train Bombings
on 03/11/2004:57

Country

Symbol

Germany

DAX

United
Kingdom

FTSE

Spain

IBEX

Belgium,
France,

N100

57

Id.

Exchange
Name
Frankfurt
Stock
Exchange
London
Stock
Exchange
BME
Spanish
Exchanges
Euronext

Closing Closing
price on price on
03/10/04 03/17/04

Recovered
to closing
price from
03/10/2004
on… at…

4,044.70

3,896.89

04/05/2004
4,048.60

4,545,30

4,456.80

04/16/2004
4,537.30

8,292.90

7,948.10

04/07/2004
8,294.80

643.48

626.45

04/05/2004
644.16

FIU Law Review

52

[7:43

Holland,
Portugal
Tourism, airline travel, and stock markets suffered nearly unprecedented declines after the attacks of 9/11 and the Madrid train
58
bombings, but they appear to have recovered thereafter. Such recovery may have given rise to some level of complacency, as will be
seen below. Some believe that the price of gold has soared because of
the terrorist threat.59
How do we measure the cost of the effects and risks presented by
terrorist attacks? Paul Krugman, the Nobel Prize winning, Princeton
economist, has said that:
We can say that the economic costs of terrorism are similar, in
principle, to the economic costs of crime. As surveys like Glaeser (1999) point out, these costs can be divided into the direct
losses from criminal acts; the costs of spending on law enforcement; and the costs of distorted individual decisions because of
fear of crime.60
In other words, the costs are diffused with effects spreading over
a broad spectrum of society. What do terrorist attacks cost us? What
does the fear of terrorist attacks and increased security cost businesses? According to the Office of the Comptroller of New York City,
the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attack cost New York
City $27 billion during the first 15 months following the event.61 By
2010, the Transportation Security Administration had spent $40 bil62
lion screening passengers since September 2001. The lost time because of waiting for security checks at airports – since “time is money”
– is measured in the billions.63
In 2009, the insurance payouts after the 9/11 attack – according to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics – was $39.4 billion, which accounts for
payouts in a variety of insurance lines, as set forth in the following
58 Larobina, supra note 22, at 147; see also DEAN C. ALEXANDER, BUSINESS CONFRONTS
TERRORISM: RISKS AND RESPONSES 17 (2004).
59 Banamber Mishra & Matiur Rahman, The Dynamics of Bombay Stock, U.S. Stock and
London Gold Markets, 4 INDIAN J. ECON. BUS. 151 (2005).
60 Paul Krugman, Professor, Econ. & Int’l Affairs, Princeton Univ., Address at The Nexus
of Terrorism & WMDs: Developing a Consensus at Princeton University, The Cost of Terrorism: What Do We Know? (Dec. 12-14, 2004), available at http://www.l20.org/publications/9_
7Q_wmd_krugman.pdf (citing E. Glaeser, An Overview of Crime and Punishment, WORLD
BANK (1999)).
61 Matthew Bandyk, What Airport Security Costs You, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
(Jan. 11, 2010), http://money.usnews.com/money/business-economy/articles/2010/01/11/whatairport-security-costs-you.
62
63

Id.
Id.
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chart (Figure 2).64 However, this does not take into account all of the
losses for New York City, which appear to be around $95 billion.65

64 Claire Wilkinson & Robert P. Hartwig, Terrorism Risk: A Reemergent Threat,
INSURANCE
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE
3
(Apr.
2010),
http://www.iii.org/assets/docs/pdf/Terrorism
Threat_042010.pdf.
65 Daniel Indiviglio, The Economic Cost of Terrorism, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 28, 2009),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/12/the-economic-cost-of-terrorism/32650/.
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Figure 2:66

After the 9/11 attacks, insurance companies either increased their
67
rates for terrorism coverage or dropped such coverage altogether.
The biggest impact of insurance hikes has been felt in the aviation
68
industry, in addition to other industrial sectors. It is estimated that
overall insurance premiums have increased by an average of thirty
69
percent, with certain assumed targets experiencing higher increases.
A terrorist attack is intentional, and therefore, it is difficult to predict
with any accuracy the frequency or severity of such attacks. This has
made some insurance industry analysts question whether the risk is
70
insurable at all.
Generally, insurance exists to alleviate the insured’s potential
losses and create profit for the insurer. This twofold objective is
achieved in great part by calculating measurement costs, that is,
66

Wilkinson & Hartwig, supra note 64.
OECD, Economic Consequences of Terrorism, 124 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
71 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/60/1935314.pdf.
67
68
69

Id.
Id.

70

Wilkinson & Hartwig, supra note 64.
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the probability that a risk will materialize and the magnitude of
the loss in case of the materialization. Insurance coverage and
profitability rest on the accuracy of this calculation. Terrorism,
on the other hand, exists to create a perpetual threat and chronic
fear of unpredictable, future risks of losses. In essence, the concepts of insurance and terrorism are diametrically opposed. Ultimately, terrorism renders risk probability and loss magnitude
nearly incalculable, consequently decreasing the insurance market's profitability and hence its coverage.71
Companies have had to purchase enhanced insurance coverage,
which is often not available, and certainly not for the prices of the
72
past. Travelling employees and executives have to be protected;
company facilities have to be turned into hardened targets. Different
states take different attitudes toward terrorism insurance, some requiring it and some helping in its provision.73 Further, states consider
74
that the international food supply could be a target. Of course, it is
mostly multinationals who produce, store, and transport food.75 The
maritime industry is also considered vulnerable.76
71

Larobina, supra note 22, at 147-56.
Krug, supra note 44.
73 Some prominent examples include the following: Spain requires terrorism insurance and
has done so since the 1950s. See Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Financial Protection of Critical Infrastructure, INSTITUT VEOLIA ENVIRONMENT (Report No. 3), available at http://www.institut.
veolia.org/en/cahiers/protection-insurability-terrorism/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). The program
is administered by private insurers and backed by a government program. Id. After terrorist
attacks in London in 1993, insurers announced that they would exclude acts of terror as a covered risk in commercial insurance policies. Id. Industry and government discussions then resulted in an insurance pool of insurance companies acting as re-insurers and backed by the government. Id. However, the purchase of such insurance is not mandatory. Id. The attacks in
New York on 9/11 caused the items covered by the pool to be increased. Id. Since 1986, French
law required terrorism coverage to be included in commercial insurance policies. Id. This was
also increased after 9/11 when, in December of that year, France created the world’s first terrorism insurance pool, guaranteeing coverage of companies, in a public-private partnership of coreinsurance, backed up by the government. Id. Germany does not have mandatory terrorism
insurance for companies. Id. German law does not require insurers to provide terrorism insurance in their basic contracts. Id. Right after the 9/11 attacks, German insurers either refused to
write any new policies covering terrorism or if they did, it was substantially reduced from coverage prior to 9/11, and it took 6 months of wrangling with the government for the creation of a
public-private partnership, which created a new insurance company, called Extremus, that writes
only terrorist insurance. Id. Extremus acts as a direct insurer. Id. Companies cannot insure
one facility only; they must ensure their entire company. Id. The coverage is only for incidences
occurring in Germany, and has policy limits, so that most companies are under-insured. Id.
74 John T. Hoffman & Shaun Kennedy, International Cooperation to Defend the Food
Supply Chain: Nations are Talking; Next Step – Action, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1171, 1173
(2007).
75 Id. at 1176.
76 Caitlin A. Harrington, Heightened Security: The Need to Incorporate Articles
72
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What is the world community doing about all of this to protect its
companies and its commerce from interdiction or destruction? Do
the business enterprises of the world have protection under international law? We know that technology provides for us the unprecedented opportunity for communication, connections, transfers, and a
host of other things that increase prosperity for people and for companies, but at the same time, the concentration of intricate networks
and assets also provide for a hitherto unprecedented vulnerability for
individuals, governments, and corporations.
In a speech at an internet security conference in 2010, FBI Director Robert Mueller said that “[m]ilitant groups, foreign states and
criminal organizations pose a growing threat to U.S. security as they
target government and private computer networks.” 77 He believes
that groups such as al-Qaeda will use the Internet, not simply as a recruiting and financing tool, but also to make cyber-attacks on the developed world.78 Of course, such security problems and threats of attack are also dilemmas for companies and nationals of states other
than the United States.
The Pentagon believes that China has developed the ability to infiltrate and manipulate many “secure” governmental systems.79 In
80
fact, the Pentagon computer system was hacked into in 2008. Apparently 24,000 files were stolen,81 seemingly regarding the new F-35
strike fighter under development.82 Cyber-security appears to be a
question on the minds of many, and a spirited debate is underway as
to what the proper role of government in this area should be.83 For

Convention on the Law of the Sea, 40 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 107, 108-09 (2007); Singapore
Forms Maritime Special-Operations Unit, 17 SPECIAL WARFARE 3 (2005).
77 Alexei Oreskovic, FBI Director Warns of Growing Cyber Threat, REUTERS (Mar. 4,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/05/fbi-internet-idUSN0410902320100305.
78

Id.

79

Julian E. Barnes, Chinese Hacking Worries Pentagon, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/04/world/fg-uschina4.
80 John P. Mello, Jr., Pentagon: Yep, We Got Hacked, TECHNEWSWORLD (Aug. 26, 2010),
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/70699.html.
81 Antoine Georges, Department of Defense Hacked, 24,000 Military Files Stolen,
BLAMZA (July 15, 2011), http://www.blamza.com/department-of-defense-hacked-24000-militaryfiles-stolen/.
82 Michael Horton, U.S. Department of Defense Hacked - F-35 Fighter Data Stolen, TECH
FRAGMENTS, (April 21, 2009), http://techfragments.com/news/696/Tech/US_Department_of_
Defense_Hacked_-_F-35_Fighter_Data_Stolen.html.
83 Shaun Nichols, RSA: Experts Clash over Role of Governments to Prevent Cyber Security Attacks, V3.CO.UK (Feb 28, 2012), http://v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2155899/rsa-experts-debaterole-government-cyber-security; Josh Smith, Businesses, Republicans Aim For Cybersecurity
Assistance,
Not
Regulation,
NAT’L
JOURNAL
(Oct
11,
2011),
www.nationaljournal.com/tech/businesses-republicans-aim-for-cybersecurity-assistance-notregulation-20111011.
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example, should government provide security to private networks, or
should government require that private networks provide their own
security pursuant to mandated standards? As a practical matter, the
internet is vast and does not readily lend itself to over-arching security
measures by anyone.84 The United States Congress appears concerned, and more than thirty Cyber Security bills have been introduced in Congress; now, there seems to be enough momentum to pass
one of them.85
Weapons technology hackers, cyber-terrorists, or terrorists who
86
wish to cripple a large-area power grid can do so with relative ease.
Individuals and groups have developed the desire and the technical
capacity to damage or destroy inanimate objects as well as individuals,
and they do.87 Our systems and facilities are more and more vulnerable to attacks.88 This provides a distinct vulnerability for advanced
societies, their facilities and other assets, especially for the companies
89
belonging to those advanced societies. Companies and governments
are spending time and money to learn how to deal with cyber90
Some companies are paying considerable sums to learn
terrorists.
about intrusion detection, advanced firewalls, public key infrastructure (a framework for the secure exchange of digital information), and
forensics, among other things.91 Some companies also want to make
themselves “hard targets” in order to dissuade terrorist attacks.92
A survey by Security Magazine showed that after the 9/11 attacks, 87% of corporate security departments took action to reevaluate their security programs, upgrade, and hire new staff.93 According to Bill Anderson, Director of Global Security for Ryder Sys-

84 Dan Lungren, Cyber Security is a Team Sport, THE HILL’S CONGRESS BLOG (Feb. 3,
2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/208579-rep-dan-lungren-r-calif.
85 Gerry Smith, Cybersecurity Legislation Gaining ‘ Momentum’ In Congress,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/01/cybersecuritylegislation-congress_n_1247147.htm.
86 Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Rise of Complex Terrorism, FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 1,
2002),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2002/01/01/the_rise_of_complex_terrorism?page=full (last
visited March 30, 2012).
87 Id.
88
89

Id.
Id. at 53.

90 Linda Tischler, No Security, 61 FAST Co.
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/61/security.html.
91

Id.
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Post Sept. 11th, Security Re-evaluates, SECURITY MAGAZINE (Jan. 3, 2002),
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94
tem Inc., “the danger of an attack involving the international transportation system remains high.”95
Although business is now more aware of its vulnerability than
ever before, except for an early post-9/11 spurt, corporations neither
appear to have greatly increased their security expenditures nor to
96
have hired large numbers of security personnel after 9/11. Most
97
small businesses simply cannot afford to. However, some large corporations have now hired chief security officers – with law enforcement backgrounds rather than business – and a few business and
transportation industry terrorism task forces have been formed to
focus on the issue.98 One industry that appears to have trouble adjusting to the post-9/11 world is the insurance industry, since the Federal
99
support plan for terrorism risk insurance, which was supposed to
have been a stop gap, temporary program to aid the insurance indus100
try to adjust, has been extended twice, most recently for seven years.
Terrorism is not new, and the risk of terrorist attacks to multinationals was not heralded in only by the events of September 11,
2001.101 As early as 1993, some commentators were worried that “virtually every multinational organization and its visible management
team are at least theoretically susceptible to terrorist attack.”102 It was
estimated that IBM spent $100 million on its worldwide security in
103
1993. Data show that most terrorist attacks since the 1960s are directed at people, business, and infrastructure related to business.104
However, The Economist has warned that American businesses are

94 Ryder System, Inc., a Fortune 500 transportation services company, considers itself a
“provider of leading-edge transportation, logistics and supply chain management solutions.”
About Us, RYDER SYS., http://www.ryder.com/aboutus_home.shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
95 Bill Anderson, Strengthening Global Supply Chain Security , SECURITY MAGAZINE
(June 17, 2008), http://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/strengthening-global-supply-chainsecurity-1.
96 Larobina, supra note 22, at 147.
97 Rachel Emma Silverman, Workplace Security (A Special Report) – Changing Workplace – Under the Radar: For Most Small Business, Increased Security Seems Like an Unnecessary Cost, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 11, 2002).
98 Larobina, supra note 22, at 152.
99 Terrorism Risk Ins. Act Of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat 2322 (2002).
100 Terrorism Risk Ins. Extension Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–144, 119 Stat 2660 (2005);
Terrorism Risk I Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–160, 121 Stat 1839
(2007).
101 Corporate Terrorism: A New Global Threat, 79 MGMT. REV. 39 (1990); Robert S.
Fleming,, Assessing Organizational Vulnerability to Acts of Terrorism, 63 S.A.M. ADVANCED
MGMT. J. 27 (1998).
102 Barton Laurence, Terrorism as an International Business Crisis, 31 MGMT. DECISION 22
(1993).
103
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not taking the dangers posed by potential terrorist attacks seriously
and have not sufficiently bolstered their defenses since 9/11.105
A variety of studies show that many businesses are not spending
106
what some feel they should for security, and some industry officials,
such as the healthcare industry, in particular, fear that more should be
107
108
spent in this area. According to the Conference Board, the spending that has been done has not been evenly-distributed across industries.109 Perhaps, primarily because most believe they will not be a
target and that the odds are on their side. After all, terrorists only
have the means to make so many attacks. Small companies spend the
least, both as a finite number and as a percentage of revenues.110
However, despite the fact that the majority of international or multinational enterprises may not directly suffer from terrorist attacks,
they will likely suffer indirectly.111 Such indirect impact takes the form
of declines in buyer demand; increased international business transactions costs; interruptions in international supply chains; and government policies, regulations, and procedures enacted to deal with terrorism that hamper the flow of business and cause declines in foreign
direct investment.112
The random nature of attacks – no one can predict them – and
the willingness or the desire to inflict great numbers of non-combatant
casualties has made modern-day terrorism more “terrifying.” 113

105 Business: Homeland Insecurities; Business and Terrorism , THE ECONOMIST
NEWSPAPER, Aug. 23, 2003, at 52.
106 Id.; Karen Halm, Study: Stunted Security Management, 69 J. PROP. MGMT 1 (Nov.-Dec.
ed., 2004); Who's Scared? No Boom In Corporate Security Spending, ISHN NEWS (Aug. 8,
2003), http://www.ishn.com/articles/who-s-scared-no-boom-in-corporate-security-spending (last
visited Mar. 30, 2012).
107 Benchmarks: Overall Security Spending, INST. OF FIN. & MGMT. (2011), http://
www.iofm.com/content/resources/OverallSecuritySpending1.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
108 See About Us, CONFERENCE BOARD, http://www.conference-board.org/about/ (last
visited Mar. 30, 2012).

The Conference Board is a global, independent business membership and research association working in the public interest. [Its] mission is unique: To provide the world's leading
organizations with the practical knowledge they need to improve their performance and
better serve society. The Conference Board is a non-advocacy, not-for-profit entity holding
501 (c) (3) tax-exempt status in the United States.
109 Thomas E. Cavanagh, Corporate Security Measures and Practices: An Overview of
Security Management Since 9/11, CONFERENCE BOARD (Special Report, 05-01-SR),
http://www.neweraassociates.com/downloads/conference_board.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
110 Ellen M. Heffes & Jeffrey Marshall,, Security: Middle Market Firms Split on Spending,
FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, at 10 (Oct. ed., 2004).
111 Czinkota, supra note 48.
112 Id. at 827, 831, 834.
113 Quin Li & Drew Schaub, Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism, 48(2)
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 230, 240, 252-53 (2004).
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Religiously inspired terrorists may be especially dangerous. Religious terrorists [which many of the al-Qaeda claim themselves
to be] often feel engaged in a struggle of good against evil. Most
undertake violent behavior to please the perceived commands of
a deity, which can make them relatively unconstrained by secular
laws or values. Religious terrorists are often alienated from the
existing social system, which they seek to eliminate rather than
improve. They typically receive popular support from people
114
and organizations in countries and cultures around the world.
The trading nations of the world are increasingly vulnerable to
international terrorist activities, as are – because they are on the front
line, so to speak – the companies that conduct the business between
those trading nations.
More than $1 billion USD in goods cross the Mexican border dai115
ly. In 2003, ships unloaded 18 million 40-foot cargo containers filled
116
This is what happens close to
with goods at United States’ ports.
home for Americans. A similar increase in cargo-shipping activity has
taken place worldwide.117 The United States Customs and Border
Protection service has implemented a container security program that
thousands of importers, carriers, and freight intermediaries have
118
signed up for.
Such programs cost money and if the overseas exporter does not want to be troubled by the requirements, a small
United States importer has little power to change its mind, though
large companies like Wal-Mart have little trouble in forcing compliance.119
This enormous amount of traffic gives rise to multiple targets for
interdiction or destruction. Further, the number of containers and
trucks crossing borders provides multiple opportunities for terrorists
to smuggle themselves and their weapons, hidden in trucks or containers, into target countries.120 Likewise, world financial markets
have seen an enormous increase in cross-border fund transfers such
that the daily turnover in the foreign exchange markets is now almost
114

Id.
Trading across the Border: The United States and Mexico’s $1 Billion per Day Relationship, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE (Oct. 31, 2011), http://commerce.gov/blog/2011/10/31/
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$2 trillion USD per day.121 This exceeds the value of traded goods.
With such a large number of financial transactions taking place, those
who wish to monitor fund transfers and find and intercept funds going
to finance terrorist activities find themselves confronting a daunting
task.122
The impact on air travel across the United States and around the
world has been enormous – between 9/11 and 2009, airlines lost $55
billion.123 In the months after 9/11, airline revenues were down
worldwide, causing roughly 100,000 airline workers to lose their jobs
124
And, of course, four fully-loaded, fully-fueled
around the world.
commercial aircraft were destroyed in the attacks of 9/11.125 Nearly
18,000 businesses were disrupted, relocated, or destroyed as a result of
the attack in New York, and the Gross City Product of New York
City was reduced by over $27 billion during the remaining months of
126
According to Douglas A. McIntyre, the editor
2001 and 2002.
of 24/7 Wall St., a financial commentary website, the typical terrorist
targets are “strategic assets, like oil fields and financial institutions.”127
III.

TERRORISM UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

128
The
Law is considered to be an instrument of social control.
idea is that society attempts to achieve uniformed behavior by gener129
ally describing behavior that is prohibited. The desired behavior is
then encouraged by discouraging the undesired behavior through
punishment.130 The populations of many states today consider them131
selves to be living under the rule of law. They believe that the rule
of law bestows upon them, as citizens, the advantages of the preven-

121
122

Id.
Id.

123 Ben Steverman, Renewed Terrorism Threat Rattles Airlines, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 30, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/dec2009/
pi20091229_644479.htm.
124 Shane Hall, The Effects of Terrorist Attacks to the Airline Industry, EHOW.COM (Mar.
9, 2011), http://www.ehow.com/facts_5011704_effects-terrorist-attacks-airline-industry.html.
125 Nat’l Comm’n On Terrorist Attacks Upon The U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION (Aug. 21,
2004), http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.htm.
126 John London, The Effects of 9/11 on the Economy, EHOW.COM (Feb. 11, 2011),
http://www.ehow.com/info_7923249_effects-911-economy.html.
127 McIntyre, supra note 51.
128 CLARK & MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 1-3 (Marian, Quinn,
Barnes eds., 7th ed., 1997).
129 Id. at 3-4.
130 Id. at 64.
131 Andrew Altman, ARGUING ABOUT LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
18 (Peter Adams et al. eds., 2d ed., 2001).
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tion of arbitrary and corrupt government, the restraint of vengeance,
132
and the provision of individual liberty and economic prosperity.
Some of the very first principles of the concept of the rule of law
are that a law must be made public and must be reasonably clear and
specific in meaning and in what it prohibits.133 And, of course, it must
134
be applied equally to all, that is, without discrimination. The rule of
law is considered an essential element of a functioning democracy and
a functioning economy.135 This sentiment has been echoed time and
136
again by many, including the United Nations itself, which said:
Promoting the rule of law at the national and international levels
is at the heart of the United Nations’ mission. Establishing respect for the rule of law is fundamental to achieving a durable
peace in the aftermath of conflict, to the effective protection of
human rights, and to sustained economic progress and development. The principle that everyone – from the individual right up
to the State itself – is accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, is a
fundamental concept which drives much of the United Nations
137
work.
Another principal tenet of the rule of law is that government
should maintain peace and order, for the most part through a system
of laws or rules that specify both violations and their corresponding
sanctions accruing to violators, leading at least one set of writers to
point out that: “Liberal democracies are especially susceptible to terrorism because elected officials are expected to protect the lives and
138
property of their electorate or face defeat in a subsequent election.”
This leads to the notion that no act can be regarded as a crime, unless
there is a specific law prohibiting it, and no one can be punished, unless they have committed an unlawful act described as a crime. Legal
scholars refer to these concepts as nullum crimen sin lege (“no crime
without a law”) and nulla poena sin crimine (“no punishment without
139
140
a crime”). In other words, crimes must be clearly defined.
132
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Their world has no international crime of “terrorism” in the
sense of a delicta juris gentium. Further, terrorism, in and of itself, is
141
neither a war crime nor a crime against humanity.
With no international definition of terrorism,142 can one call international terrorism a crime with any authority? Can one be prosecuted under a crime that has no definition? In this context, what is
the role of the rule of law that we all espouse? I suggest that if the
international community is serious about stopping international terrorism under color of law, then a definition is needed.
In 1926, Romania suggested that the League of Nations promulgate a treaty to outlaw and provide sanctions to those who engage in
terrorist activities.143 In the 1930s, the international community
wished to set up a unified regime regarding international crimes, and
terrorism was discussed at a number of international conferences during the early years of that decade.144 The first important modern attempt to define terrorism as an international crime was undertaken by
the League of Nations,145 resulting in the 1937 Convention on the Pre146
vention and Punishment of Terrorism. Even though it was adopted
147
by the League and signed by twenty-four states,148 it was only ratified
by one state149 and did not enter into effect.150 It failed to gain traction,

140
141

Id.
Frequently Asked Questions: International Law Aspects of Countering Terrorism, U.N.

OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME at 41 (2009),, http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/
Publications/FAQ/English.pdf.
142 Lord Carlisle of Berriew, The Definition of Terrorism: A Report by Lord Carlisle of
Berriew Q.C. Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation at 3 (Mar. 2007),
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/mar/uk-definition-of-terrorism.pdf.
143 Ben Saul, The Legal Response of the League of Nations to Terrorism, 4 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 78, 80 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=915777.
144 George Sliwowski, Legal Aspects of Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND
WORLD SECURITY 69, 72 (David Carlton & Carlo Schaerf eds., 1975).
145 At the end of the First World War, an intergovernmental organization was created, the
League of Nations, whose purpose was to prevent all future wars. The Covenant of the League
of Nations established an assembly and a council whose job was to settle disputes, enforce sanctions, and implement peaceful settlements. KAREN MINGST, ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 37, 231 (2d ed. 2003).
146 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Terrorism, opened for
signature Nov. 16, 1937, League of Nations Doc. C.546.M.383 1937 V (1938).
147 Ilias Bantekas, The International Law of Terrorist Financing , 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 315,
315 (2003).
148 Thomas M. Franck & Burt B. Lockwood, Jr., Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism, 68 AM. J. INT’L LAW 69, 70 n.5 (1974).
149 ILIAS BANTEKAS, SUSAN NASH, & MARK MACKAREL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 229 (2001).
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151
because war was coming, and as some have suggested, because a
number of states believed the definition of terrorism was too broad.152
In those days, terrorist acts were, more often than not, attacks or
attempted assassinations of heads of state, royalty, or political figures,
not normally against large civilian groups.153 The circumstances surrounding the drafting of the 1937 Convention concerned the assassination in 1934 in Marseille, France of the visiting King Alexander I of
Yugoslavia.154 In that attack, the Foreign Minister of France was also
killed, simply as collateral damage, when a French police officer shot
155
As we all know, terrorist
him accidentally in the ensuing melee.
attacks have become more violent since that time.
In the twenty-first century, terrorists have changed tactics and
targets. The United Nations Security Council Resolution of 2001 told
all states to issue legislation that would make terrorist acts a crime.156
Such statutes were to include financing, planning, preparation, and
support for terrorism and the commission of acts of terrorism in such
crimes.157 Because the resolution was issued under Chapter VII of the
158
charter, it was mandatory on all states and not merely precatory.
159
However, the resolution did not define terrorism.
Apparently,
states were to fend for themselves and define terrorism as they
wished, if they could.
With no definition – and no comprehensive treaty – the United
Nations is concerned that the organization cannot “develop a comprehensive strategy against terrorism, . . . and . . . [t]his prevents the
United Nations from exerting its moral authority and from sending an
unequivocal message that terrorism is never an acceptable tactic, even
for the most defensible of causes . . . .”160 Roberta Arnold, an international lawyer, scholar, and former legal adviser to the Swiss Department of Defense also believes that, without a comprehensive treaty,
161
bringing responsible parties to justice is a recurring problem, and
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cites, among others, the failure to arrest Abu Abbas, the leader and
person responsible for the 1985 Achille Lauro high jacking, until the
United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003.162
Many acts considered to be acts of international terrorism are
separate crimes under the laws of various states.163 Further, many
states have attempted to define terrorism, and a variety of definitions
164
appear in their statutes. However, what is considered terrorism in
one country – whether they use that definition for their own domestic
legal purposes or for international legal purposes – is not considered
terrorism in another.165 Definitions vary to a considerable degree and
“[s]panning several continents, an international network cynically
exploits national differences in the tolerance of foreign terrorists, in
the liberality of laws of asylum and extradition, and in the preservation of civil liberties.”166 Some international lawyers currently believe
that the recent attempts by liberal democracies to make counterter167
rorism laws have even gone too far, and conclude that “no State can
legally adopt strategies aimed at combating international terrorism if
those strategies simultaneously derogate from established international human rights norms.”168 The Security Council has also voiced
this concern; for example, in Security Council Resolution 1624, a 2005
anti-terrorism resolution required states to: “ensure that any measures
taken to implement this resolution comply with all of their obligations
under international law, in particular international human rights law,
refugee law and humanitarian law.”169
Attempts at definitions have taken one of, at least, two approaches.170 One is a generic definition, self-inclusive into which pre171
Some call this a
sumably all – or most – terrorist acts would fit.
172
“top-down” or deductive approach. The other approach uses a va162
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riety of clearly and narrowly defined categories of acts that, when taken together, make up an open-ended framework for defining – often
173
This is known as a
only implicitly – and suppressing terrorism.
174
“ground-up” or inductive method, something Rohan Perera, Chairman of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee to Eliminate Terrorism, called an “operational approach,” one much like that taken by
traditional criminal law.175
The governments of many states have taken the deductive ap176
proach by attempting to make a catch all definition. For example,
Title 22 of the United States Code defines terrorism as follows:
(d) Definitions
As used in this section—
(1) the term “international terrorism” means terrorism
involving citizens or the territory of more than 1 country;
(2) the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents;
(3) the term “terrorist group” means any group, or
which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism;
(4) the terms “territory” and “territory of the country”
mean the land, waters, and airspace of the country; and
(5) the terms “terrorist sanctuary” and “sanctuary”
mean an area in the territory of the country—
(A) that is used by a terrorist or terrorist organization—
(i) to carry out terrorist activities, including training,
fundraising, financing, and recruitment; or
(ii) as a transit point; and
(B) the government of which expressly consents to, or
with knowledge, allows, tolerates, or disregards such use
of its territory and is not subject to a determination under—
(i) section 2405(j)(1)(A) of the Appendix to title 50;
(ii) section 2371 (a) of this title; or
177
(iii) section 2780 (d) of this title.
173
174

Id.
Id.

175 Thalif Deen, U.N. Unable to Define Terrorism, PRAVDA (Jan. 12, 2010),
http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/01-12-2010/116016-UN_unable_to_define_terrorism-0/.
176 Head, supra note 167, at 109.
177 22 U.S.C. § 38 ¶ 2656f(d) (2006).
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As can be seen, under this United States statute, state terrorism
is not included in the definition of international terrorism since only
178
“subnational groups” or “clandestine agents” can commit terrorism.
Another United States definition of terrorism is found in the Code of
Federal Regulations: “the unlawful use of force and violence against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or so179
cial objectives.” It may surprise people to know that “almost every
agency of the United States government that deals with the threat
180
It
of terrorism maintains its own definition of that phenomenon.”
should not be surprising that other states have trouble with a uniform
definition.181
The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as:
Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of
force or violence by a group or individual based and operating
entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico without foreign
direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.
International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state.
These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts occur outside
the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of
the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their
perpetrators operate or seek asylum.182
Some have made the definition a catch-all that can be used not
only to protect the populace but also to suppress political dissent.
Such an example is the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Ter178

Id.

179

28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2010).

180

“Terrorism:” Why the Definition Must Be Broad, 24 WORLD POL’Y J. 47, 47 (2007).
Id.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Terrorism 2002-2005, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

181
182

http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005/terror02_05#forward (last visited
Apr. 13, 2012).
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183

This group de-

Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes,
that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective
criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing
fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in
danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to
public or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize a [sic] national resources.184
This, of course, is an international – though not universal – defi185
nition. It is a very broad definition and does not appear to require
any political or ideological motive, so what in some countries would
be a traditional crime, could be considered terrorism under this definition. Russia’s 2006 law, called On Counteraction to Terrorism, defines terrorism as “‘practice of influencing the decisions of government, local self-government or international organizations by intimidating the population or using other forms of illegal violent action’ as
well as the ‘ideology of violence.’”186 The notion of “other forms of
illegal violent action” seems broad indeed.
Terrorism is a word charged with emotion and one which is often
used as a propaganda tool by governments.187 For example, the Kurdistan Workers Party says the Turkish government paints the Kurdistan Workers Party as a terrorist group for internal political purposes.188 The United States State Department publishes annual reports

183 The members of the League of Arab States are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti,
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Member
States, ARAB LEAGUE ONLINE, http://www.arableagueonline.org (follow “Member States”
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 13, 2012).
184 The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, Art. 1, § 2, Apr. 22, 1998
(adopted by the Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior and the Council of Arab Ministers of
Justice), available at http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/terrorism98.htm.
185 See ARAB LEAGUE ONLINE, supra note 183.
186 Mariya Y. Omelicheva, Russia’s Counterterrorism Policy: Variations on an Imperial
Theme, 3 PERSP. ON TERRORISM 1, 9 n.5 (2009), available at http://www.terrorismanalysts.
com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/61/html.
187 Noam Chomsky, LANGUAGE AND POLITICS 473 (2d ed., 2004).
188 Xende
Biradosti, Who Is The Terrorist?, KURD NET (Nov. 2, 2012),
http://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/2/turkey3756.htm; see also Michael Loadenthal,
Asymmetric Labeling of Terrorist Violence as a Matter of Statecraft Propaganda: Or, Why the
United States Does Not Feel the Need to Explain the Assassination of Osama Bin Laden, 1
ANARCHIST DEV. CULTURAL STUD. 113, 124 (2011), available at http://anarchistdevelopments.org/index.
php/adcs/article/view/42.
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on terrorism and keeps track of terrorist incidents worldwide,189 but
the definitional problem has caused London’s The Guardian to question whether such statistics are meaningful,190 and to suggest that “any
classification of terrorist groups is fundamentally motivated by selfinterest.”191 One problem with defining anything is that of distinguishing it from what it is not. Terrorism appears to be no exception.
Most definitions include the ideas of involving violence and sowing
terror or fear within a population; and do not provide any exemption
192
Of course, a government’s
for struggles for self-determination.
counterterrorism activities would also likely include violence, and as
most statutes respecting the prevention of crime, would also likely be
designed to strike fear in the hearts of would-be “terrorist[s],” rather
than “‘innocent’” populations.193 Therefore, some clarification appears necessary in any definition. Further, as Professor Ruth Blakely
of the University of Kent in Canterbury, England, points out, even
democracies, sometimes engage in terrorism or sponsor terrorism.194
Should an exception be made, that is, should state-sponsored or state
terrorism be excluded from the definition? This generates troublesome sticking points for many states in arriving at a consensus on a
definition.195 Totalitarian states are often loath to closely define state
196
Former colonies, developterrorism or state-sponsored terrorism.
ing countries, and many states in the Middle East want to clarify that
any definition should exclude struggles for self-determination or violent actions taken to push out an occupying force.197 Relations among
states are dominated by the self-interest of sovereign states,198 and

189 See United States Department Bureau of Counter Terrorism, DEP’T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2012); Country Reports on Terrorism, DEP’T OF
STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/index.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2012),.
190 Brian Whitaker, The Definition of Terrorism, GUARDIAN (May 7, 2001),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/may/07/terrorism.
191
192
193

Id.
See Head, supra note 167, at 667, 669.
See “Terrorism:” Why the Definition Must be Broad, 24 WORLD POL’Y J. 1, 49 (2007)

(quoting an American World War II bomber pilot) (describing state violence and collateral or
unintended damage).
194 Ruth Blakeley, Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies, 6 EUR. POL. SCI. 228,
229 (2007).
195 See RAMRAJ ET AL., supra note 158; see also Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, War on the
Enemy: Self-Defence and State-Sponsored Terrorism 7-9, 18-20 (bepress Legal Series, Working
Paper No. 1352, 2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1352
196 Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, Defining Terrorism (a project
financed by the European Commission) (Oct. 1, 2008), http://transnationalterrorism.eu/
tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%204.pdf.
197 See Head, supra note 167, at 5, 10.
198 ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GORAN SLUTTER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, at ix
(2008).
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despite the fact that states have treaty obligations to prosecute inter199
national crimes, state sovereignty is a major obstacle to the effective
200
enforcement of international crimes.
The United Nations General Assembly came close to a working
definition in its 1994 declaration, entitled “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,” condemning “all acts, methods and practices
of terrorism.” It called terrorism:
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror
in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for
political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever
the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial,
ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.201
Even this definition does not say what a “criminal act” is.202 Is it a
criminal act under international law (with universal jurisdiction?), or a
criminal act under a state’s domestic law? If the Resolution refers to
domestic law, that is potentially problematic because, as stated, domestic criminal law definitions vary considerably from state to state.203
Of course, a General Assembly declaration or resolution does not
204
make or have the force of international law though such a declaration can either reflect or eventually give rise to customary international law if it is followed by enough states on a consistent basis and is
supported by the subjective effect of opinion juris.205
Why have the world community and the United Nations Legal
Committee been unable to reach a consensus? Why can they not define terrorism and agree upon a comprehensive convention to eliminate terrorism, approving and ratifying the draft which has languished
since 2000? According to Thalif Deen, United Nations Bureau Chief
and Inter Press Service Regional Director for North America, there
are at least two main sticking points in reaching a consensus defini199 Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 577, 580

(Nick Passos ed., 2003).
200

Id.

201

G.A. Res. 49/60 (I), U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Dec. 9, 1994).

202

Id.
See infra Table 3.

203
204

MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 114-15 (6th ed. 2008).
Opinion juris is the second leg of binding customary international law, the first being
consistent behavior, and the second being a subjective belief that one is bound by such customary behavior, or that one (a state) has such opinion juris. Mere customary practice without the
subjective feeling of an obligation or opinion juris, would give rise to mere comity and not law.
CARLOS ARELLANO GARCÍA, PRIMER CURSO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 189
(1999); see also S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
205
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tion: the question of state terrorism – or state-sponsored terrorism –
and the notion that populations occupied by a foreign power have a
right to resist and so a definition of terrorism should not preclude that
right.206
According to Deen, the “hard-line position on ‘terrorists,’ ‘state
207
terrorism,’ and ‘freedom fighters,’ have mostly come from Arabs.”
He said that one Arab diplomat has commented, “there will never be
an agreed definition of terrorism as long as the Palestinian issue remains unsettled.”208
It appears that the concept of state terrorism is politically
charged. Some consider the United States’ occupation of Iraq as
“state terrorism.”209 The United States would not want such a definition to include those activities, but certainly United States’ presidents
have used the term state-sponsored terrorism on a variety of occasions without giving it a specific or generic definition.210 A number of
powerful actors on the world stage may be apprehensive about any
definition including state or state-sponsored terrorism, since many
have been accused of engaging in the activity.
Although the International Court of Justice did not use the word
“terrorism” or “state-sponsored terrorism” in the case Nicaragua v.
United States, the court found that the United States had engaged in
and sponsored activities that many today would consider statesponsored terrorism.211 Troops of the United Kingdom were found to
have engaged in actions that many objective observers would today
call terrorism of the local population in Northern Ireland.212
Belgian activities in Africa,213 French activities in Algeria, and the
Russians in Chechnya, all could be considered by some to be state
terrorism. The Russians call the Chechen fighters terrorists; the Che-

206 Thalif Deen, The Most Elusive Word, INTER PRESS SERV. (Dec. 1, 2005),
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=31267.
207
208
209

Id.
Id.
Id.

210 At various times, the downing of the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland and the
activities of Hamas, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Hezbollah, and North Korea have all been considered state
or state-sponsored terrorism by American leaders.
211 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 , 45-51 (June 27).
212 Jason Walsh, Saville Report on Bloody Sunday Massacre Exonerates Victims,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(June
15,
2010),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0615/Saville-report-on-Bloody-Sunday-massacreexonerates-victims.
213 See, e.g., ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED,
TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1998).
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214
Little wonder that
chen fighters say they seek self-determination.
there is so much controversy over the terminology. Some make the
argument that there needs to be no new treaty or legal definition that
would include state terrorism, since, they argue, international humanitarian law and the law of war (jus in bello) together deal with the mat215
Accordingly, as the acclaimed international law
ter well enough.
professor M. Cherif Bassiouni has said: “[Conventions] . . . only partially addressed the problem, . . . [p]artly because the problem was
addressed from the perspective of states seeking to control non-state
actors, while failing to control state-committed and state-sponsored
terror-violence.”216
China has recently lamented the lack of an international definition as well as a domestic laws definition, stating they needed such a
definition in their domestic law in order to better combat terrorist
217
activities, which they say are plaguing the country. In October 2011,
China therefore enacted a new anti-terrorism law that defines terrorist acts as:

those intended to induce public fear, to harm public security or
to coerce state organs or international organizations by means of
violence, damage, threats or other tactics that cause or aim to
cause severe harm to society by causing casualties, bringing
about major economic losses, damaging public facilities or dis218
turbing social order . . . . ”
The language “or disturbing social order” seems to give the state
a very broad scope of defining many acts as acts of terrorism.
States are all over the waterfront in their definitions of terror219
ism. Table 3 below is a list briefly outlining a few states’ definitions
of terrorism:220

214 Maryann Bird, Chechnya: The Fight for Rights, TIME, Jan. 26, 2003, available at
http://time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,411387,00.html
215 Hans-Peter Gasser, Acts of Terror, “Terrorism” and International Humanitarian Law,
847, INT’L. REV. OF RED CROSS, 547, 549 (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_847_gasser.pdf
216 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS
1937-2001, xxv (2001).
217 China Defines Acts of Terrorism, Allows Funds, Assets to Be Frozen , BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Oct. 29, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-29/china-lawmakers-vote-tostrengthen-legislation-aimed-at-fighting-terrorism.html.
218

Id.

219

Lord Carlile, The Definition of Terrorism, 9-16 (Mar. 2007), http://www.officialdocuments.gov.uk/document/cm70/7052/7052.pdf.
220

Id.
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Table 3, Countries & their domestic definitions of terrorism

221

Country

General Description

Comments

Australia

Similar definition to See Security Legisla222
tion
Amendment
the UK

(Terrorism)
Act
2002. An action to
advance a political,
religious or ideological cause and with the
intention of coercing
the government or
intimidating the public.

221
222

Id.

UK Definition: Terrorism: interpretation.
(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where—
(a) the action falls within subsection (2),
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international
governmental organization or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it—
(a) involves serious violence against a person,
(b) involves serious damage to property,
(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action,
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.
(4) In this section—
(a) “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom,
(b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated,
(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other
than the United Kingdom, and
(d) “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of
the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom.
(5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference
to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.
Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 1, as amended, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2000/11/section/1.
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Austria

Canada

China

Egypt

France
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No separate national Terrorism referred to
in the criminal code,
definition.
but they are not specific terrorism offences.
Similar definition to Defined by specific
the UK. The legisla- references to UN
tive matrix is complex. Conventions and Protocols. Acts intended
to intimidate the public or compel a person, a government or
a domestic or international organization
to do or refrain from
doing any act, inside
or outside Canada;
refers to serious injury or risk to health
and safety, and substantial
property
damage.
Extremely broad.
Includes aspects of
freedom of speech
and association.
Very broad, substan- Criticized by UN
tially unchanged since Human
Rights
murder of President Committee.
Sadat.
Broad.
Code refers to disturbance to public
order by means of
intimidation or terror. Would certainly
characterize a serious
idiosyncratic criminal
(e.g. Thomas Hamilton) as a terrorist.
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Russia

Spain

Switzerland

United States
of America

Broad in terms of actions, with intention to
undermine public security, terrorize the
population, or pressurize the authorities to
take decisions.
Vey broad definition
of terrorism; also, aggravated form of ordinary crime where intention is to subvert
the constitutional order or to effect serious
disturbances of public
order.
Broad definition comparable to UK.

USA PATRIOT Act
of 2001. Very broad
definition

Department of State
operationally describes
terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by
sub national groups or
clandestine
agents,
usually intended to
influence an audience.”

75

Special court system
for dealing with terrorism; procedurally
different from other
serious crime.

Statutory defense if
intention is to establish or re-establish a
democratic regime or
the rule of law or to
enable the exercise or
safeguarding of human rights (Penal
Code art. 260, para.
3).
Wide executive powers including access
to confidential information about citizens. A pendulum
reaction to the events
of 9/11.
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There are at least three elements of definition that states and international bodies have used in analyzing the inductive and deductive
approaches: a substantive element, a jurisdictional element, and an
223
intent-oriented element. Normally the deductive approach is distinguished by a rather broad substantive element – that is, many actions
could be included in the substantive definition – and “a general, politically oriented intent element.”224 Thus, the deductive method attempts to abstract the general qualities of “terrorism” so that the activities cover a wide variety of criminal conduct, but those activities
constitute terrorism only in specific circumstance, namely in those
circumstances described in the intent element.225 Hence, the intent
element in the FBI definition of domestic terrorism: “in furtherance
226
of political or social objectives.”
The inductive method definition uses a fairly precise definition of
the conduct that constitutes the substantive element and leaves out
the political intent element that is found in the deductive approach.227
This is the method that has resonated in the international sphere.228
Rather than taking the deductive approach and fully deal with a
comprehensive definition head on, the international community has
chosen instead to take a “sectoral” approach, by means of which certain offenses that are considered activities of terrorists are identified
and treaties (or conventions) are negotiated and signed covering those
229
specific categories of offenses.
Those sectoral treaties include:
x The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts

Committed On Board Aircraft230
x The 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft231
223

Levitt, supra note 170, at 104.
Id. at 108.
225 Levitt, supra note 170, at 108-09.
226 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Terrorism 2002-2005, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005/terror02_05#forward (last visited
Apr. 13, 2012).
227 Levitt, supra note 170, at 109.
224

228
229

Id.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE UNITED NATIONS
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 4 (Guiseppe Nesi ed.,
2006).
230 185 countries have either ratified or acceded to the treaty, including the United States.
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft , INT’L CIVIL
AVIATION ORG., http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/leb/Tokyo.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
231 185 countries have either ratified or acceded to the treaty, including the United States.
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft Signed at the Hague , INT’L
AND
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x The 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Against the Safety of Civil Aviation232
The 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages233
The 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
234
Material
The 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation235
The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation236
The 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf237
The 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for
238
the Purpose of Identification

CIVIL
AVIATION
ORG.,
http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Hague_EN.pdf (last visited Feb. 6,
2012).
232 188 countries have either ratified or acceded to the treaty, including the United States.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation , INT’L
CIVIL AVIATION ORG.,http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Mtl71_EN.pdf
(last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
233 166 countries have either ratified or acceded to the treaty, including the United States.
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME,
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/Special/1979%20International%20Convention%20aga
inst%20the%20Taking%20of%20Hostages.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
234 145 countries have either ratified or acceded to the treaty, including the United States.
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_status.pdf (last visited Feb. 6,
2012).
235 171 parties have either ratified or acceded to the treaty, including the United States.

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/leb/Via.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
236 156 countries have either ratified or acceded to the treaty, including the United States.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/
pdfs/maritime.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
237 146 countries have either ratified or acceded to the treaty, including the United States.

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on
the Continental Shelf, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/
tldb/pdf/IMO_Updates/Prot88.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
238 80 countries have either ratified or acceded to the treaty, including the United States.
Convention on the Making of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection , U.N. OFFICE ON
DRUGS AND CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/Commonwealth_Chapter_11.pdf
(last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
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x The 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Ter-

rorist Bombings239
x The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism240
x The 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts
241
of Nuclear Terrorism
Five of the foregoing treaties mention terrorism by name – the
remaining seven do not.242 A typical preamble in one of the foregoing
treaties (that mention terrorism by name) has words to the effect of,
“[d]eeply concerned about the worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,”243 but there is no definition of
what that terrorism just mentioned, which gives rise to this concern.
Apparently, whatever terrorism is, it gives rise to concern. Additionally, terrorism is not defined in any of the foregoing sectoral treaties.
So for purposes of those mentioning terrorism – that is, mentioning a
concern about it – someone who engages in the prohibited behavior is
presumably engaged in an act of terrorism, although the treaties do
not expressly say that.
For now, it will be quite difficult for the international community
to effectively counter a violent or disruptive act if it does not fall within the foregoing conventions’ narrow definitions of activity.244
Carlos Diaz-Paniagua, involved in coordinating the negotiations
of the proposed United Nations Comprehensive Convention on In239 161 countries have either ratified or acceded to the treaty, including the United States .
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings , U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS

CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/Special/1997%20International%20Convention%20for%20the%20Suppression%20of%20Terrorist.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
240 167 countries have either ratified or acceded to the treaty, including the United States.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, U.N. OFFICE ON
DRUGS AND CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/Special/1999%20International
%20Convention%20for%20the%20Suppression%20of%20the%20Financing%20of%20Terrorism
.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
241 115 countries are signatories to the treaty, 49 of which have ratified or acceded to the
treaty. The United States has not ratified the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME,
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/Special/2005%20International%20Convention%20for
%20the%20Suppression%20of%20Acts%20of%20Nuclear%20Terrorism.pdf (last visited Feb.
6, 2012).
242 Concise link to summary of above treaties. International Legal Instruments to Counter
Terrorism, UNITED NATIONS ACTION TO COUNTER TERRORISM, http://www.un.org/terrorism/
instruments.shtml (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
243 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Preamble,
Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197.
244 Bradley Larschan, Legal Aspects to the Control of Transnational Terrorism: An Overview, 13 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 117, 134 (1986).
AND
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ternational Terrorism, believes that we need a precise definition of
terrorism in international law, and he has said:
Criminal law has three purposes: to declare that a conduct is forbidden, to prevent it, and to express society's condemnation for
the wrongful acts. The symbolic, normative role of criminalization is of particular importance in the case of terrorism. The
criminalization of terrorist acts expresses society's repugnance at
them, invokes social censure and shame, and stigmatizes those
who commit them.245
He goes on to say that such clear and universal criminalization
may tend to deter terrorism, as those values become universally ac246
cepted.
We need, in other words, a clear definition of what terrorism actually is before we can implement a regime of criminal sanctions and
define the scope of jurisdiction. In its Baku Declaration, the International Progress Organization247 said:
The United Nations Organization should urgently convene an international conference with the aim of establishing a precise and
legally sound definition of terrorism. Unless this effort at codification is undertaken, the term “terrorism” will continue to serve

245 Carlos Fernando Diaz-Paniagua, NEGOTIATING TERRORISM: THE NEGOTIATION
DYNAMICS OF FOUR UN COUNTER-TERRORISM TREATIES 41, 1997-2005, New York University
Dissertation (2008).
246 Id.
247 The International Progress Organization defines itself as

an international non-governmental organization that enjoys consultative status with the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and is associated with the United Nations Department of Public Information. The I.P.O. is not affiliated with any political party
or organization. It is strictly non-partisan, and not aligned with any government. The
I.P.O. cherishes its independence and its reputation for tackling complex international issues with candor, toughness and objectivity. The organization based in Vienna, Austria,
sponsors international conferences and research seminars on topics such
as democracy, human rights, dialogue of civilizations, conflict resolution, international
law, and economic development; monitors elections and the human rights situation in various countries; co-operates with academic institutions and international NGOs on all continents; and publishes the series “Studies in International Relations.” The I.P.O. was founded in 1972 in Innsbruck, Austria, by students from Austria, India and Egypt, who were concerned about relations between cultures and civilizations and the growing North-South divide.
What is the International Progress Organization? , INT’L PROGRESS ORG., http://www.i-po.org/description.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
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only as a tool to justify brute power politics and to obfuscate the
248
superpower policy of double standards.
At least one influential international lawyer, who has written
widely on the subject, is convinced that “[t]he elaboration of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism will effectively contribute to the prevention, control, and supervision of various forms
and manifestations of [the problem].”249 The terrorist bombings in
London in 2005 prompted then Secretary-General Kofi Annan to call
for the UN Member states, through the UN Ad Hoc Committee on
Terrorism, and especially the draft UN Comprehensive Convention
on International Terrorism, to define, once and for all, the term “terrorism,” inasmuch as the draft convention had been languishing for
over 5 years, primarily because of definitions.250 After the UN legal
committee failed later that year to reach such a definition, the Secretary-General wanted the world leaders at the Millennium Summit of
September 2005 to strongly condemn all acts of terrorism and issue a
declaration that, among other things, would say:
We affirm that the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians
and non-combatants cannot be justified or legitimized by any
cause or grievance, and we declare that any action intended to
cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government
or an international organisation to carry out or to abstain from
any act, cannot be justified on any grounds, and constitutes an
act of terrorism.251
This would have gone a long way to providing a road map for an
international definition – using the deductive approach – though of
course any such declaration at a summit conference would be a political event and not a practical legal solution. Even so, it could have
been persuasive, and would at least have tended to lock in those in
agreement to a definition for later treaty-making. In the event, the

248 The Baku Declaration on Global Dialogue and Peaceful Co-Existence Among Nations
and the Threats Posed by International Terrorism, INT’L PROGRESS ORG. (Nov. 9, 2001),

http://i-p-o.org/Baku_Declaration.pdf.
249 BASSIOUNI, supra note 216, at xxvii.
250

UN

Seeks

Definition
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Terrorism,

BBC

NEWS

(July

26,

2005),

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4716957.stm.
251 Revised Draft Outcome Document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General
Assembly of September 2005 Submitted by the President of the General Assembly, Advance

Unedited Version, A/59/HLPM/CRP.1/Rev.2 (Aug. 5, 2005), http://www.un.org/ga/59/hlpm_
rev.2.pdf.
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declaration did not say the foregoing, did not arrive at a definition,
but among other things said:
“We strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,” committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever
purposes, “as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.”252
We stress the need to make every effort to reach an agreement
on and “conclude a comprehensive convention on international
terrorism" during the sixtieth session of the General Assembly.253
This was no better than any other previous multilateral attempt,
using a word to define itself. The sixtieth session of the General
Assembly came and went and still we had no comprehensive
treaty with a definition.254
Another problem with definition on an international level is how
does one deal with strictly domestic “terrorism”? Should it be treated
in the same way as international terrorism? In other words, terrorism
of the variety that the international community should concern itself
with? And if so, should the perpetrators of those acts be subject to
universal jurisdiction?255 Should the Europeans be concerned about
hunting down and prosecuting an American who bombs the Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, or should the Mexicans go after Chechens
who assault a Russian schoolhouse? Should any definition in a treaty
include violence occurring within a state when perpetrated by nationals of that state with no outside involvement?
There has been a long-standing tradition in international law and
United States law that people engaged in certain political violence
have the right of asylum and are neither detained nor extradited.256
The process of reaching a consensus is fraught with obstacles, not
257
the least of which is the general political nature of terrorism. This
likely gives rise to the fact that the international community is attempting to work in a context of both politics and law at the same
time; this duality often gives rise to tension and conflict not only be-

252
253

Id.
Id.

254 Upendra D. Acharya, War on Terror or Terror Wars: the Problem in Defining Terrorism, 37 DENV. J. INT’L & POL’Y 653, 655 (Fall 2009).
255 See text infra for definition of Universal Jurisdiction. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:

NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES 4 (Stephen Macedo ed.,
2004).
256 See Christopher H. Pyle, Defining Terrorism, 64 FOREIGN POL’Y 63, 63-78 (1986).
257 BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (2006).
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tween these two issue areas, but also among the various states that
258
have their own take on both of these issues.
STATES HAVE DIFFERING AGENDAS AND DEFINITIONAL
CONCERNS

IV.

International law generally works very well, with states respect259
ing and following it on a daily basis, generally without question. For
example, the rules of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade,
the World Trade Organization, and the attendant dispute resolution
260
mechanism are highly evolved, respected, and they work effectively.
Aircraft fly from New York to Paris and around the world; letters are
posted to overseas locations; ocean commercial fishermen go about
their daily business; billions of dollars worth of goods are bought and
sold. All of this happens flawlessly as a result of international law,
which governs all of the foregoing and much more. No one even
questions whether or not to follow the rules; they just do.261
Can international law work in this matter of countering international terrorism? Those areas that are politically charged, such as the
law of the use of force, like the law of war or defining an act as terrorism, give rise to considerable difficulties, with one nation justifying
what they did under international law, and others condemning the
activity as a violation of international law.262 Because areas of international law that are fraught with politics give rise to disputes that are
not easily resolved or even at times resolvable, many question the
effectiveness of international law. Most international law is not politically charged. It just works.263
V. JURISDICTION
As seen above, definition is a serious problem. Another is jurisdiction, since for prosecution to take place, jurisdiction is required.
We know that in general, the term jurisdiction refers to “a court’s
264
power to decide a case or issue a decree.” In order to deal with a
terrorist, a court would need personal or in personam jurisdiction: the
“power to bring a person into its adjudicative process”265 and subject-

258

Id. at 16-17.
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CONWAY W. HENDERSON, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4 (2010).
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 145-146 (2d. ed. 2008).
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CONWAY, Supra note 259.
Id. at 4-5.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 707 (Abridged 8th ed. 2005).
Id. at 709.
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matter jurisdiction, that is, “over the nature of the case.”266 As one
writer has said:
The usual prerequisite a State needs to satisfy in order to exercise criminal jurisdiction is the demonstration of a link between
itself and either the facts in question, the effects thereof, or the
authors of the alleged crime: its involvement is justified according to territoriality, personality, or security (the principle of protection).267
There are certain crimes that are deemed to be so heinous and
deemed to affect the entire international community that for them
there is an exception to the aforementioned specific link.268 The
crimes of piracy, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes
against peace are such crimes,269 since such crimes are regarded as
“particularly offensive against the international community as a
270
whole.” Professor Stephen Macedo of Princeton University, an advocate of universal jurisdiction, probably described the benefits of the
concept best when he said:
Universal jurisdiction appears as a potent weapon: it would cast
all the world’s courts as a net to catch alleged perpetrators of serious crimes under international law. It holds the promise of a
system of global accountability - justice without borders - administered by the competent courts of all nations on behalf of humankind.271
In light of this, the 2005 resolution of the Institut de Droit International states:
Universal jurisdiction in criminal matters, as an additional
ground of jurisdiction, means the competence of a State to prosecute alleged offenders and to punish them if convicted, irrespective of the place of commission of the crime and regardless of any
link of active or passive nationality, or other grounds of jurisdiction recognized by international law.

266

Id. at 710.

267

Robert Kolb, Universal Criminal Jurisdiction in Matters of International Terrorism:
Some Reflections on Status and Trends in Contemporary International Law, 50 REVUE
HELLENIIQU DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 43, 58 (1997).
268 Id.; see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 5, (7th
ed. 2008).
269 Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW 668 (6th ed. 2008).
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Universal jurisdiction is primarily based on customary international law. It can also be established under a multilateral treaty
in the relations between the contracting parties, in particular by
virtue of clauses which provide that a State party in the territory
of which an alleged offender is found shall either extradite or try
272
that person.
At the end of the day, there is a prevailing view, prejudice really,
that terrorism is a subjective matter, and that “one person’s terrorist is
another person’s freedom fighter.”273
VI.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR A WAY FORWARD

Companies have an obligation to protect their employees, their
customers, and their shareholders’ wealth. Trade associations and
their company members can work to make themselves less attractive
targets for terrorist acts.
With respect to a comprehensive treaty and a definition, it can be
argued that if a person commits an act that falls between the cracks of
the sectoral treaties – even though some would consider the act to be
terrorism – and if he or she is arrested for that act pursuant to an International Criminal Court (“ICC”) subpoena or by a country having
no connection to the crime, that person would have a very strong argument that: (1) the ICC or the state court has no jurisdiction to act in
the matter; and (2) the person committed no crime for which he or
she can be prosecuted and should be set free.
According to the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, trade means faster growth, higher living standards, and
new opportunities through commerce.274 The United Nations believes
that trade, commerce, and business encourage economic development; economic development brings with it better living standards for
the world.275 Economists also believe this.276 Conversely, things that
disturb or impede trade, commerce, and business, would therefore
likely impede development and development’s concomitant rise in
global living standards. Terrorism, as has been discussed, impedes
272 Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with Regard to the Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes, Resolution, INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, SEVENTEENTH
COMMISSION (Aug. 26, 2005), http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_03_en.pdf.
273 ARNOLD, supra note 161, at 335.
274 Unitral, About Unitral, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about_us.html.
275 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 66/94, Report of the Sixth Committee (A/66/471) 66/94, Report of
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Forty-Fourth
Session (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/66/ActionbyGA.shtml (follow “66/94”
hyperlink under “GA Resolutions & Decisions).
276 See HENDRIK VAN DEN BERG, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS ch. 1 (2004).
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trade; causes business to slow down; and causes business to spend
time and money in security, insurance premiums, and rebuilding after
a terrorist attack; they lose business and Foreign Direct Investment is
discouraged.277
Yet, there seems to be no real effort on the part of business on a
global scale to deal with the problem except on a piecemeal basis.
There is no concerted effort, and some multinationals are larger than
nation states. They do have some clout. I find no evidence of multinationals lobbying their governments to push for a definition of international terrorism, a crime that concerns us all. I suspect that it may
be out of an ignorance of the problem, simply trusting that their governments and the international community, the UN perhaps, has dealt
with the issue by now.
International chambers of commerce and other trade and industry groups can and, I suggest, should, on a transnational basis, arrive
at a consensus respecting a workable definition. They might be able
then to persuade their respective governments to push for international consensus on such a definition.
What should such a definition entail? First, the targets need to
be included in any such definition: innocent people, assets, infrastructure, systems, and technology. Violence needs not be a requirement
since the attack of a computer system, infrastructure, or a water supply would not necessarily entail violence, but could have a devastating
effect.
Second, the motivation should be addressed since general criminal statutes in states’ domestic laws deal adequately with the physical
acts that most incidents of terrorism entail. Motivations such as religious, ideological, and political should be included. The objective
should also be part of a definition: the intention of influencing a
group or a government to do or abstain from doing something; to
change a policy or implement one through acts designed to cause terror, fear, or apprehension.
Because of the strongly-held beliefs of a variety of people, especially in the non-industrialized world or former colonies, there should
be exceptions for struggles of national liberation or defense against
occupying powers. This may serve two purposes: to get a fair number
of such countries to sign on to such a definition, and to discourage
states from the unauthorized use of force, of attacking, attempting to
annex, colonize, or otherwise occupy other states. Further, such a
277 Kyeonghi Baek & Xingwan Qian, An Analysis on Political Risks and the Flow of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing and Industrialized Economies , 6 ECON., MGMT. AND FIN.
MARKETS 4, available at http://buffalostate.edu/politicalscience/documents/baekfdi.pdf.
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definition could perhaps leave out state terrorism and state-sponsored
terrorism because those issues are likely fairly well-covered by the
Geneva Conventions, international humanitarian law, and customary
international law.
In short, the issue of a definition of international terrorism – to
include comprehensive treaty or convention outlawing terrorism and
providing for its punishment and universal jurisdiction – has not been
dealt with and companies large and small should lobby and sponsor
educational programs to enlighten the populations of their countries
about the problem. Governments must be pressured to act. Only
then will we have a definition that the world cannot only live with, but
can use adequately and collectively to fight the problem of terrorism.
It must also be remembered that in any attempt to abolish and
prevent terrorism, the states of the world must start with the proposition that violence of this nature does not have to be an inescapable
reality like hurricanes or floods. Terrorism is not a natural disaster;
the murder of innocents is not a natural occurrence like bad weather.
Unlike earthquakes, acts of terrorism require motives, planning, and
human intention. Accordingly, acts of terrorism are based on a calculated choice to use such acts to attain some end. Terrorism should
therefore, be preventable.

